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Abstract
The control and interlock system of the main power converters was 20 years
old and needed to be replaced. In order to face the shrinking resources of
CERN, it was decided to adopt, as far as possible, standard industrial solutions
and to contract out the development of the new system to industry. A tender
was sent to European firms and the contract was awarded to GTD, a Spanish
Engineering Firm, in May 1997. The SPS accelerator restarted in March 98 with
the new Control and Interlock System.
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Introduction
SPS, Super Proton Synchrotron, is an accelerator originally designed and
commissioned in 1976 for protons, but subsequently modified to also receive
electrons, positrons and heavy ions.  Its circumference is about 7 km and it is
located 60 m under ground.  Protons are injected at 14 GeV, to be accelerated
to 450 GeV for fixed target physics in two experimental areas. SPS also
functions as an injector for LEP, accelerating electrons and positrons to
22 GeV.
In the SPS, the particle beam is maintained on a circular path by a magnetic
guide field produced by 746 dipole magnets distributed around the synchrotron.
All dipoles are connected in series via two water-cooled conductors in which the
current flows in opposite directions in order to minimise the stray field due to
this current and to reduce the inductance. 12 power converters are used to feed
the dipole magnets (see : Fig. 2).
The cross-section of the particle beam is maintained by a system of 216
quadrupole magnets, alternatively focusing and defocusing.  The focusing
quadrupoles are all connected in series in one circuit and the defocusing
quadrupoles in a second circuit.  Each circuit is fed by a dedicated power
converter (see: Fig. 3).
The 14 power converters, together with 3 spare power converters, are fed from
an 18 kV substation located in the central electrical building. Cables of various
lengths, up to a maximum of 3 km, bring the power and the remote control from
a central place to the individual rectifiers. The power converters together with
the 18 kV substation constitute the SPS Main Power Converters.
The distribution of the power converters around the SPS accelerator brings with
it a considerable risk to personnel and equipment. The control and interlock
system detects faults and may stop all the main power converters or, if
necessary, switch off all 18 kV circuit breakers.  Faults are displayed on the
front panel of the individual converter and the information is transmitted to the
control room. In addition, the control and interlock system allows the remote
control of the power converters from the control room.
The control and interlock system of the main power converters was obsolete
and its replacement by a new system was completed in April 98.  The new
system is based on a technical infrastructure with Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs).
                                               
*
   J. Varas - GTD, Barcelona, Spain
The Challenges
The development of the new CIS involved many challenges and risks both at
the contractual and technical level.
The challenge at the contractual level, was to define a relationship which takes
into account the specific constraints imposed by the operation of the machine:
total integration of the CIS within the SPS control room, strict deadline due to
the machine schedule, limited test period, identification and solving of problems
during the operation, etc.  The lowest bidder rule specified by CERN purchasing
rules introduces additional difficulties.
The technical challenges were mainly related to the characteristics of the
installation: power converters with a peak output power of up to 160 megawatts,
the geographical distribution of the power converters and the distances
involved. In addition, the CIS is a safety system. It must guarantee personnel
and material safety while minimising the SPS accelerator down time.
The Contractual Approach
The technical specification used for the tender included two parts: a product
specification and a document describing precisely the execution of the contract
and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the parties.
The product specification document was based on ESA PSS-05 software
engineering standards. The production of the document obliged CERN to clarify
the problem in terms of functionality required but also in terms of performance,
safety and reliability objectives. The document was also aimed at providing
sufficient material to estimate the development cost while allowing the
contractor to use his competence and creativity to develop the solution. The
specification was structured so as to allow the tracing of each requirement
during the development.
CERN was much involved during the execution of the contract.  CERN staff
members carefully followed the development in order to identify any deviation,
as early as possible and to make sure that the required product would be
delivered on time and to specification.  The role of CERN was however not
limited to the control of the development. A genuine collaboration between
CERN and GTD was set up and the involvement of staff members in the project
reviews was also aimed at providing the necessary knowledge to diagnose
problems during the future operation and maintenance of the system.
The Technical Solution (see Fig. 1)
Taking into account the figures of safety, reliability and availability as requested
by the System Requirements Document, it was clear that well proven industrial
standard control and command devices should be used.
The use of applications oriented technology was considered, however it was






x Reduced implementation time.
Therefore, the solution was based on the adoption of “state of the art” industrial
technology and its adaptation to the special conditions of operation required by
the CIS (in particular: tolerance to power-supply short interruptions, cabling
standards). However, the system analysis and design required to match the
strict specifications were getting complicated because of the use of this
standard technology.
In fact, the whole system analysis and design was performed using an object-
oriented methodology (OMT). This required an extra effort to introduce the
methodology for the analysis of industrial programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), since they do not directly support some of the programming structures
used by object oriented techniques.
The principal topics related to the design are summarised in the following
points :
1) In order to achieve the safety levels requested it was necessary to
implement complex fully distributed local safety control, after it was shown
that simpler central reaction architecture introduced unacceptable delays.
19 industrial PLCs (Siemens 31x) were installed, one for each of the 17
power converters, one at the power sub-station and one for central co-
ordination.  In order to meet the challenging speed requirement, high-
speed acquisition devices and special software procedures for fast local
safety-reaction were introduced.  Measurements have shown nominal
values of less than 4 ms between fault information input and safety
reaction output.
For the analysis and development of the fully distributed safety control, the
use of an object oriented analysis methodology was considered essential.
2) The system must be capable of delivering information on “Power Supply”
status to different users and for different purposes.  This means that
although fully distributed for the safety control, it must be globally co-
ordinated in order to perform different user actions that deal with the
multiple safety constraints.  All the procedures, ranging from configuration
selection to the start up of system synchronised pulsing, require a
systematic and simultaneous follow up of the total system status and the
co-ordination of issued actions.
The philosophy followed for the design and development of these
functions was a centralised one.  A central co-ordination PLC was
installed.  It is capable of communicating simultaneously with each of the
18 distributed control devices in order to read field information at
scheduled intervals, to provide control procedures and to grant global
safety reactions.
The goal was to achieve an efficient global communication channel with 18
devices along an 8 km path. The use of standard industrial devices had
been accepted as a constraint and the result was the combination of two
independent field-buses into one virtual bus using the central co-ordination
PLC, as a bridge.  Thanks to this architecture and by correctly managing
the field-bus bandwidth it was possible to double the field-bus range
without losing performance.
Although a standard industrial field-bus architecture was chosen, it just
provides low-level communication features.  Two additional protocol layers
were introduced to support the communication :
x The first layer supports the real time transmission of safety
parameters and provides dynamically distributed paths for
information/command transmission.
x The second layer supports information flow during sporadic
configuration processes.
The information path is dynamically distributed in order to match the size
of the information items being transmitted through the field-bus.  These
information packets are variable in size; this variability has been accepted
in order to avoid the transmission of unnecessary data.  Therefore, the
occupancy of the field-bus is near 90%.  Thanks to the architecture
chosen, reductions in the field-bus performances will neither affect the
basic safety communications nor the user commands.  The dynamic
distribution of the field-bus bandwidth will always grant basic services
while slowing down some information packages and not critical command
responses.
Despite the 8 km long architecture, CIS events can be time stamped by
using an external synchronised event (the SPS Start of Super-Cycle) and
a complex co-ordination procedure.  The system synchronises itself about
200 times per day in order to compensate the internal clock drift declared




The interface between the Control Interlock System and the system’s
users (including other external clients) is achieved using a HP/UX based
Gateway and specific software tools.  The objectives of the software tools
were :
x to provide the system administrator with a configuration capability
x to provide the specialist users with system information and control
capability
x to provide the system operators in the control room with
concentrated system information and a reduced control capability
x to provide information to the CERN alarm management system
CAS, using CERN SL-Alarm protocol
x to provide information and control capability to external clients
using CERN SL-Equip protocol
x to perform internal surveillance tasks such as process control,
time synchronisation and system configuration.
Fig. 1: CIS technical solution
After having analysed and designed the whole system (the HP/UX based
Gateway, the Operator applications as well as the 19 PLC’s software) using an
object oriented methodology, the programming of the Unix applications was
done in C++ (approx.: 200.000 lines of code).
The programs for the PLC’s were written in SCL, an International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard language similar to PASCAL.
Hardware Interlock Loops (HIL)
The power involved is such that a problem with fault detection, or a failure of
the automatic stop procedure of the converters, may cause the destruction of
the equipment.  This would stop operation of the SPS for a few hours or even a
few days.  Moreover, a malfunction within the CIS could make an area
potentially dangerous.  Therefore, it was decided to equip the CIS with a
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HIL is composed of 19 crates with one close to each PLC.  The HIL crates are
made up of simple devices such as relays and optocouplers, linked together by
multi-core cables.  Each HIL crate is able to directly release one or more of the
safety devices autonomously, or on request from its related PLC request (see
Fig. 3).
Conclusion
The control and interlock system of the main power converters was obsolete
and its replacement became necessary. The development of the new CIS
involved many challenges and risks both at the contractual and technical level.
The technical specification based on ESA PSS-05 software engineering
standards was provided to the contractors in order to be able to define the plan,
estimate the cost and start the development.  The document was also aimed to
give CERN a means to follow carefully the development lifecycle.
Thus, a close collaboration between CERN staff and contractor was necessary
to reach the final objective : the start up of the Main Power Supplies with the
new CIS at the beginning of 1998.
During the first six months, experience from operating the system has been
encouraging. The CIS system fulfils all its expected functions for the SPS
machine.
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EMD 124 EMD 125
Load:
108 focusing  magnets
108 defocusing magnets
Supplies:
3 SMQ power converter
I nominal peak= 2000A
U nominal = 3.5kV 
Peak Power = 7 MW
































































I nominal peak = 6000A
U nominal  = 2 kV / converter
Peak power = 144 MW
Load
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Fig. 4: Hardware interlock Loop : HIL
